Seeking a Lady of Justice in Person

Seeking A Lady Of Justice In Person And Not Merely In Statues#

Introduction#

"Women judges, with their intuition and understanding, are more likely to reach the right decision... I hope to discharge my duties with some measure of credit." - JUSTICE ANNA CHANDY , the first woman in India to become a High Court judge (Kerala )1956

She did not merely say this – she lived it. At a time when the legal profession was overwhelmingly male-dominated, she used both the pen and the gavel to challenge patriarchal norms—advocating for consent within marriage, questioning unequal “conjugal rights,” and founding platforms like Shrimati, a Malayali magazine to push for women’s property rights and widow remarriage. She was, undeniably, ahead of her time. Her journey did not begin at the top—it began with entry at the lowest rung of the judiciary, a space that enabled merit to overcome structural barriers. She was appointed as a Munsif Magistrate in Travancore in 1937. However, the path she forged is now being narrowed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its 2025 judgement reinstated mandatory 3 years practice rule to the recruitment exams for Civil Judge (Jr.Div.)/ Magistrate of First Class observing that “raw graduates” as Judicial Officers has not proved to be a successful experiment” While the concern for judicial preparedness is valid, the recent judgment appears to misidentify the core issue. It proceeds on the assumption that years of legal practice necessarily translate into judicial competence. Yet, even within the legal profession, there have been instances (like that of a 71 year old Supreme Court advocate hurling of shoe on CJI) where individuals with decades of practice have failed to exhibit the responsibility expected of them, such examples weaken the assumption that quantitative years of experience alone is a reliable indicator of judicial readiness.

Hence, this essay argues in favour of qualitative evaluation and screening mechanisms instead of enforcing blanket 3 years experience requirements upon all which may appear as facially neutral; but often function as structural obstacles, disproportionately sideline women and first-generation lawyers; they must, therefore be re-evaluated through the lens of substantive equality.

Evolution Of 3 Years Practice Rule – From A Structural Tool To A Structural Barrier.#

• The 14th Law Commission Report (1958) - chapter titled Subordinate courts noted in its 11th point- Bar not a suitable recruiting ground further calling it as recruitment of failures. “It is only the exceptional young man, favourably situated and having the advantage of a senior member of the Bar interested in him, who gathers any experience at all at the Bar in so short a period of time. Such an exceptional person would naturally not care to be a competitor for entrance into the subordinate judicial service. Those who do strive to get into the judicial service after three to five years at the Bar are the disappointed persons who have failed to make a living in the profession and have no hopes of prospering in it.” However, in its 13th point under the said chapter- mandatory three-year practice time was still upheld considering the fact that some experience is better than no experience.

• The 117th Law Commission Report (1986) - The debate shifted significantly twenty-eight years later. This report , titled - “Training of Judicial Officers” made a landmark departure from the 1958 stance, recognizing that hanging around a courtroom does not equate to learning: “4.6 …….The Law Commission is of the opinion that the two years intensive training would adequately compensate for having no practice at the Bar before joining Judicial service”

• The Second AIJA Case (1993) - Judgment dated 24th August 1993- referred to as (All India Judges' Association And ... vs Union Of India And Others) - reinforced the 3 years practice rule. This Court observed: “ 20. Considering the fact that from the first day of his assuming office, the Judge has to decide, among others, questions of life, liberty, property and reputation of the litigants, to induct graduates fresh from the Universities to occupy seats of such vital powers is neither prudent nor desirable.”

• Shetty Commission Report (1999)- The commission noted that a minimum experience of 10 years for appointment as High Court Judge (Art. 217) and 7 years to be appointed as District Judge (Art. 233), no such requirement was provided for being eligible to be appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) Subsequently, the Report recommended “intensive training”

• Third AIJA Case (2002)- (All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2002) In paragraph 32, the Court observed -

“With the passage of time, experience has shown that the best talent which is available is not attracted to the judicial service. We, accordingly, in the light of experience gained after the judgment in All India Judges case direct to the High Courts and to the State Governments to amend their rules so as to enable a fresh law graduate who may not even have put in three years of practice, to be eligible to compete and enter the judicial service.”

• All India Judges Association vs Union of India (Minimum Practice issue) (2025) The Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice B. R. Gavai, in his recent judgement observed in accordance with the affidavits submitted by various High Courts and its previous 20 years experience which showed that recruitment of “raw graduates as Judicial Officers without any training or background of lawyering has not proved to be a successful experiment.”

In the 1950s, a law degree was shorter and offered limited practical exposure as opposed to the present times where a law degree is of 5 years with ‘Practical Training’ as a subject. What was once a 'structural tool' to supplement a two-year education has, in the era of five-year integrated degrees, morphed into a 'structural barrier' that delays and deviates the entry of fresh, capable minds.

Thus, as rightly said, the one who trails the fire bleeds (The precedents set by judges of mandatory 3 years practice rule in the 14th Report , 2nd AIJA case) and the one who follows learns (The 3rd AIJA case). Though the 2025 Supreme Court judgement reinstated the 3 years practice rule, as of April 2026 the matter remains under active review. This offers the court an opportunity to reconcile the professional aspirations of young graduates–particularly women– with the need for judicial efficiency, as there exists no empirical data to substantiate the premise that fresh law graduates perform poorly as judges.

3 Years Of Practice Or Violation Of 3 Fundamental Rights -#

Article 14 – Equality before law ‘AND’ equal protection of laws –#

The blanket three-year practice rule fulfills A. V. Dicey’s formal equality by applying to all genders equally. However, according to India Justice report- (2025) women represent only 8% of the Supreme Court, 14% of the High Courts and 38% of the Subordinate Courts. Decades after Hon’ble Justice Anna Chandy’s milestone, yet in the 21st century the lower and higher judiciary has failed to reach even the 33% representation seen in the grassroots democratic bodies of democracy. However, 38% (one fourth) at the subordinate level is comparatively a significant feat, largely attributed to the merit based JMFC exams. Reintroducing a practice mandate threatens to undermine this progress by further creating a structural entry barrier for young women.

French philosopher Simone De Beauvoir says “one is not born; but rather becomes a woman” The societal clock for marriage begins to tick louder for a 25-year-old woman (by the time one completes his degree) in India than for a 25-year-old man and hence though the 3-year rule seems neutral, it has a disparate impact on women. The solution lies in reasonable classification of women which is not arbitrary but a necessity. To remedy this, the judiciary must move beyond formal equality to substantive and transformative equality.

Article 15 – Prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, ‘sex’, and place of birth, while article 15 sub- clause (3) empowers the State to take affirmative actions for women and children. One such affirmative action is the women quota reservation in educational institutions. However, education is not an end in itself but rather a means to an end (achieving economic independence/employment). We acknowledge that JMFC may not be the only career option after a law student to achieve the “end” ; but that does not deny the fact that it is one of the most prestigious options for a 1st generation lawyer who has no family legacies in the said field.

Article 16 – Article 16 sub-clause (1) guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to public employment or appointment to any office under the State which includes all matters in relation to employment both prior and subsequent to the employment. However, merely having an equal access to opportunity in public employment is not enough; having ‘timely access’ to such opportunities in public employment is equally important. As rightly said “STRIKE WHEN THE IRON IS HOT” and for a student the iron is hot in his or her foundational early twenties especially for a woman in an Indian society. Water is valued when a person is thirsty( fresh graduates), once the thirst is quenched (when inducted into multinational companies/ corporate firms/ litigation) its value/use depreciates.

Medicine, Upsc And Law#

Law and Medicine, both deal with the matters of life. While medical graduates also undergo training post- M.B.B.S degree. However, they are not sent to an unsupervised ‘ private clinic ’; rather they are inducted into structured, ‘ paid residency within a hospital.’ Consequently, a woman in medicine is financially independent and empowered by the age of 25. By contrast, the three- year Bar rule for lawyers ( especially women lawyers ) is ‘unmonitored and not uniform’ to all aspirants. It forces candidates into a ‘hit- or -miss’ environment in the unorganized Bar, risking mere quantitative training over qualitative training where they risk to not ‘ learn or earn nor qualify’ the exams- making an aspirant rely on their parents and if such an aspirant is a woman , by the reasons of her biological clock alarm , she is made to get married off and is further made to depend on her husband, further risking of her being occupied with family, child and caregiving. This defeats the entire purpose of her education and hence this new rule disproportionately affects women from the field of judiciary.

The National Judicial Data Grid reveals staggering pendency of 63,97,451 cases in the High Court and 4,89,55,054 cases in the District Court. Further, India has one of the lowest judge-to-population ratios globally—21 judges per million of the population across the country. (It is 150 per million in the US) . Paradoxically , facts also reveal that India possesses the largest youth demographic, with about 65% of the population under the age of 35. UPSC often called the efficient ‘Steel Frame of India’ leverages this 65% youth population with ‘intensive structured year long training post their selection’ in the National Academy of Administration. Likewise, the Judicial Academy training can be made more robust to suit the needs of the hour so that the potential meritorious trainees get standard uniform training under the capable hands. The UPSC caps the eligibility of aspirants from 21 - 32 years of age. Thus, ironically- a 21 year old is eligible to handle the entire district; but a 25 year old with specialized law degree is deemed incapable of judicial competence. By contrast, the new 3 year practice eligibility rule tacitly prioritizes older aspirants. However, the aforesaid pendency data suggests seniority over competent trained youth has not proven to be a successful endeavor.

Conclusion#

In India, under various laws like the Indian Majority Act, 1875, the State deems a woman mature enough to enter the most life altering social contract – i.e. marriage at the age of 18 while a man must wait until 21.The law therefore tacitly accepts that a woman reaches the necessary threshold of social and emotional responsibility 3 years earlier than her male counterpart. If the lawmakers have already codified the said years, it’s logically inconsistent to ignore the same logic when it comes to judicial eligibility and hence the eligibility rule should be taken into consideration for its application ‘proportionately’.

However, the three-year eligibility rule is not the ‘best possible solution’ to train aspirants and negatively affects all young candidates irrespective of their gender. Historically, the dominant representation of men and the minority representation of women in judiciary has remained constant; therefore, the ‘equal implementation’ of the eligibility criterion grievously hurts the already marginalized representation of women in judiciary. This risks further eroding the presence of women altogether, far more than it affects the representation of men.

On the other side of the coin, if the Supreme Court upholds the three-year practice requirement to guarantee that judges are aware of courtroom tactics, it must also eliminate the resulting gender disparity results. The State should enforce Hon’ble Justice B.V. Nagarathna's corollary advice for a minimum 30% reservation for women among government law officers in order to balance these scales of justice.

It’s time that we not just say “Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao”- save girl, educate girl; but rather go a step forward to say “ Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao, Betiya Kamao”- save girl , educate girl and let the girl earn through all the opportunities at her hand. Only then the true Nari Shakti Vandan would actually stand true to its words.